critics go further to hold that any right can be made to appeareither positive or negative depending on the language used to defineit. For instance, the right to be free from starvationis considered &39; on the grounds that it implies a starvingperson must be provided with food through the positive action ofothers, but on the other hand, as James P. Sterba argues, it might justas easily be characterised as the right of the starving person not tobe interfered with in taking the surplus food of others. He writes:
What is at stake is the liberty of the poor not to be interferedwith in taking from the surplus possessions of the rich what isnecessary to satisfy their basic needs. Needless to say, libertarianswould want to deny that the poor have this liberty. But how could theyjustify such a denial? As this liberty of the poor has been specified,it is not a positive right to receive something, but a negative rightof non-interference.